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In this article we provide an overview of the historical insights in the dynamics of refugee 
policy at the time of the refugee crisis due to persecution in Nazi Germany. Historiog-
raphy on this topic is still largely based on a national perspective, with each country 
producing its own narratives and analyses. A comparative study has been undertaken 
by a group of national experts in this field which has highlighted the comparisons and 
contrasts in the responses of the various states and has also shown that individual states’ 
policies had been strongly influenced by the decisions of their neighbours.1 In this article 
we provide a synthesis of these findings, integrate new research findings and re-evaluate 
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the merits of the international refugee regime of that time which has received until now 
only dismal attention in historical research. 
1. Fleeing Nazi Germany at the worst possible time, 1933–1934
Those fleeing Germany immediately after the Nazis took power found themselves 
abroad- some with regular papers, others with no papers- in a time when immigration 
was being banned in all countries bordering Germany. While in the nineteenth century 
international immigration within Europe had been largely unregulated, during the First 
World War most European states had a controlled economy in which the state had cre-
ated institutions to regulate immigration. The post-war democratization of the polity 
had given the labor movement in some countries a say in the regulation of international 
labor migration. The state’s capacity to control international migration, in agreement 
with organized interest groups, was tested during the economic crisis of the 1930s. Given 
the economic hardship for labor, the trade unions insisted that the authorities stop all 
immigration: jobs endangered by the economic crisis should not be further jeopard-
ized by newcomers. The authorities agreed to stop immigration also in order to save on 
social expenses. The authorities were even eager to export unemployment by pressuring 
employers to dismiss foreign workers first, which the authorities then would deport as 
public charges. States indeed expelled foreign immigrants from their territory in order 
to alleviate the lot of national citizens. The timing of the mass arrival of refugees in 1933 
was thus not conductive to an easy solution of the refugees’ plight. The economic crisis 
lasted through the 1930s, notwithstanding a temporary relief in the mid 1930s. The 
Russian refugees, in contrast to those fleeing Nazi Germany, had at least the advantage of 
important labor shortages when they arrived in Western Europe at the end of the 1920s, 
which smoothened their acceptance. 
The departure from Nazi Germany of 10,000 political opponents of the Nazi regime 
and 25,000 Jews immediately after the electoral victory of the Nazi party and the chaotic 
violence perpetrated at that time was a refugee movement.2 Indeed, political opponents 
of the Nazi regime, be they part of the Jewish community, were compelled to become 
refugees as they had to flee a very brutal persecution. Dachau and other camps were cre-
ated as prisons for the political opposition, and it was immediately filled with inmates. 
Numerous other activists, in particular communists, were murdered by Nazi squads, 
murders condoned by the new regime. The severe persecution of all opposition to the 
new regime meant that these people did not have a real choice but to flee. Their flight 
could be labelled an acute refugee movement, to use the label minted by Kunz in dis-
tinction to ‘anticipatory’ refugee movements. The latter did not have to leave at the spur 
of the moment, but had some time to plan their departure. Still ‘anticipatory’ refugee 
movements are also qualified as an involuntary departure or flight in response to ‘push’ 
2	 Ibid.,	p.	28.
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factors, while (voluntary) migrants as Kunz outlined are responding to ‘pull’ factors. The 
flight of non politically active Jews from Germany in 1933 was much less a response to 
an acute threat. Some fled as they had been targeted by the chaotic violence in the wake 
of Nazi victory, others did not thrust the new rulers, and still others hoped to increase 
their opportunities by leaving Germany. In the first years of Nazi rule few overt official 
attacks on Jews were being made, largely because the Nazi regime regarded economic 
recovery as paramount. At the local level acts of violence took place and Jewish businesses 
were boycotted, but Jews were still largely protected against arbitrary measures and an 
internal migration enabled Jews to avoid local harassment. However, between 1933 and 
1937 the situation of Jews slowly deteriorated. The first preparatory steps were taken 
for the removal of all Jews from German society. Of the half million Jews in Germany, 
most were German nationals, but a few ten thousand were stateless or became stateless as 
the Nazi regime denaturalized first generation immigration and their children who had 
acquired German citizenship in the 1920s. These stateless immigrants were holders of a 
German Fremdenpass, which implied they were under the protection of the German au-
thorities. The new regime wanted to retreat from this commitment to these individuals 
by not extending the validity of these German Fremdenpasses.3 From 1935 onwards, Jews, 
even those with German citizenship who had fled abroad, were upon return downgraded 
to unwanted guests who were to be arrested and only liberated if they left again. Crucial 
in the preparatory steps was that the Nuremburg Law of 1935 gave a legal definition of 
the racial divide in Germany and qualified who were the ‘Jews’. The Nuremburg Law 
considered “Jew” and “Aryan” as mutually exclusionary categories. Those who did not 
accept this strict separation between these so-called ‘races’ by crossing that line in their 
private life were liable to persecution. Intimate relations between “Aryans” and “Jews” 
were prosecuted on the basis of the crime of Rassenschande (race defilement). These court 
cases were one of the instruments in a campaign to stigmatize and isolate the ‘Jewish’ 
Germans in German society, a preparation for the violent persecution that would be 
unleashed by 1938 and end in the Endlosung. 
2.  Unsolicited immigrants from Germany in 1933 considered  
a different kind of immigrant 
During the Depression newcomers were considered unwanted competition for scarce 
resources. Thousands of East and South European migrants had left their homes in the 
1920s to find a place of abode in Western Europe, which they hoped would improve 
their material lot. They were the first to be fired when the Depression hit these economies 
hard, and many of these unemployed foreigners who did not yet have residency rights 
were expelled from the territory of these states. The pressure on the borders mounted as 
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some of these migrants did not return to the periphery of the European economy and 
hoped to regain access to the territory of the still more prosperous Western societies. 
Besides these migrants in orbit there were also new would-be immigrants as the flows 
from the periphery of the European economy continued. These East and South Euro-
pean migrants hoped for a modicum of protection in Western Europe against the harsh 
conditions of the Depression. Adding to this flow of unsolicited migrants were political 
activists and Jews fleeing Nazi Germany. At the border posts all would-be immigrants 
without the appropriate documents and/or too few means were not admitted. Although 
it had been decided to halt all immigration, thousands of emigrants from Nazi Germany 
managed, mostly in a regular manner, to enter Western European countries. The Nazi 
regime had not yet started the attrition of the economic position of the Jewish middle 
class, and Jewish refugees could easily pose as tourists. Others entered in an irregular 
manner, in particular the political activists who mostly had to leave on the spur of the 
moment. All these immigrants from Nazi Germany could quickly attract attention to the 
specificity of their migration decision. Refugee aid organizations mushroomed, which 
catered to the needs of these emigrants and put pressure on the authorities to grant their 
protégées protection. The solidarity within civil society with like-minded activists or fel-
low believers among these uninvited immigrants insured that attention was directed to 
the reasons why they had left Germany. 
Whether the refugee aid organizations had easy access to policy makers or not, all liberal 
countries in Western Europe adhered to the principle of non-refoulement avant la lettre. 
Policymakers considered returning them to the persecuting state reprehensible. Norms 
constrained the actions of the executive authorities. Excluding repatriation did not im-
ply that policy makers were ready to grant the emigrants from Germany. The Belgian 
authorities urged refugees to move on to France, which soured diplomatic relations. In 
pursuing this intransigent policy, the Belgian government showed clearly that it was not 
prepared to share the burden when it came to refugees. However, this policy soon reached 
a stalemate as these refugees adamantly refused to return to Nazi Germany or move on 
to France. Additionally, the Netherlands took steps to close their borders for refugees for 
whom Belgium had been the first country of asylum. Concerned about the potential for 
diplomatic repercussions, by the end of 1933 Belgium conceded to accommodate emi-
grants from Nazi Germany for whom Belgium was the first country of asylum.
The most vocal and effective advocates of the refugees were the socialist refugee aid 
organizations defending their comrades in exile. They could muster enough political 
power to exempt their refugees from the protectionist immigration policy. The authori-
ties agreed that these activists could not return home and therefor deserved a privi-
leged treatment. The straightjacket in which all immigrants were forced was thus quickly 
ripped open and the authorities yielded to the political allies of these immigrants from 
Germany. A side door was opened for refugees. Communist refugees rarely tried to use 
this opportunity as the German Communist Party took the view that their stay in West-
ern Europe was only a temporary pause in the struggle against Nazism. Refugees should 
return as soon as possible because the communist victory in Germany was imminent. 
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Given the harsh repression of communists in Nazi Germany, returning to the country 
turned out to be a suicidal strategy. Most German communists, after being send back 
ended up in concentration camps. 
As mentioned before, prior to 1938 the persecution of Jewish and political refugees were 
two worlds apart. The policy in the Western European countries towards the mass arrival 
in 1933 took to a certain extent this difference into account. While political activists 
were granted a leave to remain, the authorities protected German Jews only temporarily. 
Jews from Germany recommended by a refugee committee because of anti-semitic per-
secution were only tolerated for a limited time to allow them to find a final destination, 
mostly overseas. This more conditional protection was legitimized by the less harsh per-
secution Jews were confronted with in Germany in 1933. It was also in sync with a Jew-
ish tradition to assist transitmigrants. Already at the end of the 19th century at the time 
of the great transatlantic migration, the Jewish communities in Western Europe had set 
up charitable organizations to assist Jewish emigrants from Russia and Galicia stranded 
in the European ports on their way to America. In tandem with Jewish organizations that 
built up expertise in organizing intercontinental migration, this assistance was very effec-
tive in making these transitmigrants move on. These structures were still present in the 
charitable networks of the Jewish communities and were reactivated when the emigrants 
from Germany arrived. These organizations were quickly confronted with the difficult 
task of finding a country overseas willing to take in the stateless. These refugees were the 
undocumented par excellence, and it turned out that these paper walls were extremely 
difficult to overcome. For German Jews the departure from the first country of asylum 
was less of a difficulty. 
The refugee aid organizations held the key to refugee protection. Their support granted 
political activists a leave to remain and temporary protection for Jewish refugees pending 
their travel to a final country of abode overseas. The authorities had not yielded to the 
tenet of their policy. Persecuted political activists were protected, but they were strictly 
prohibited from engaging in any economic activity. The protectionist policy, largely un-
der pressure from the trade unions was premised on the belief that the economic hard-
ship of the local population should in no way be perceived as being aggravated by this 
refugee influx. The unions agreed that any newcomer, even a prosecuted trade unionist, 
should be kept out of the national labor market. Tolerating an exemption for refugees 
would be a breach in the newly constructed dam. Independent economic pursuits of 
those newcomers were also contested by small businesses and shop owners. These groups 
compensated their weak professional organization by the shrillness of their protests. 
That refugees were kept out of the national economy implied that the refugee relief com-
mittees were very selective in recommending to the authorities immigrants who needed 
protection. By recommending an immigrant, the committee underwrote the financial 
risks of admitting him/her. If the immigrant had no (more) independent means to live 
on the aid committee had to shoulder the financial responsibilities for ‘their’ refugee. 
The Jewish aid organizations therefore had only demanded a temporary stay for their 
protégées as further migration was a cost saving device. The Jewish communities were 
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also anxious that enabling the Jewish refugees to settle would give fuel to political en-
trepreneurs exploiting anti-semitic and xenophobic sentiments. Protection for German 
refugees in Western Europe was a private-public mix. Eligibility policy was largely out-
sourced to the private sector, and these aid organizations undertook the management of 
the refugee influx and underwrote its costs. 
Norms of conduct of policy makers, strengthened by political allies of refugees in the 
country, bilateral pressure, and the determination of refugees not to return explains the 
development of a refugee policy in 1933. The authorities hoped that tolerating politically 
sensitive cases who adamantly refused to return would increase the efficiency of their 
management of migration. Public policy aimed at crediting the authorities for protecting 
their citizens against competition by immigrants for those resources such as jobs, welfare 
and customers that had become scarce due to the Depression. This public policy also did 
not entail any costs for the Treasury, as the refugee aid organization bore the brunt of 
the (financial) costs. Advocates of a hard line policy pointed out, however, that notwith-
standing a halt in immigration, emigrants from Germany continued to force themselves 
upon the neighboring countries while the authorities acquiesced. This perception of a 
loss of migration control was aggravated by a deep seated feeling that foreigners, although 
refugees, were stealing jobs and competing with local entrepreneurs in a dishonest man-
ner. The political costs of this experiment would strongly increase when the Nazi regime 
would decide by 1938 to force those considered its internal enemies out.4.
3.  Bringing the issue of refugee management to an International level,  
1936–1937
The chaotic start of the management of the German refugee crisis in which each state 
developed its own policy made the need for some international coordination obvious, 
but more important for policy makers in their endeavor to internationalize the refugee 
issue was the interest of the frontline states to improve the emigration possibilities for 
their (Jewish) refugees. The frontline states wanted the burden of refugee protection to 
be shared by the community of states. Also, the very annoying administrative cases of 
refugees in orbit, which no state considered as their refugees, needed a solution. The Brit-
ish MP Lord Cecil strongly supported the international coordination of refugee policy as 
absolutely necessary to the proper functioning of refugee policy: “It was a great mistake 
to treat the problem of the refugees as though it was a mere matter of charity. It is a ques-
tion of humanity, but it is also a political question because unless solved, the refugees 
everywhere constitute foci of irritation. A major purpose of government is to remove 
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To bring the refugee issue to an international level, a forum in which states could meet 
was needed. The most likely institution was the Nansen Office, an international organi-
sation within the Leagues of Nations’ whose mandate was not refugees as such, but spe-
cific groups of refugees. The League of Nations, already crippled by the American refusal 
to support it in the early 1920s, saw its authority weakened in the 1930s. An official 
extension of the Nansen’s office mandate to cover also the German refugees would have 
needed a decision of the League of Nations, which the Germans surely would have ve-
toed and which would have undermined the League’s overture to the USSR. The Dutch 
government took the initiative to suggest the foundation of a High Commissioner for 
the refugees from Germany which in order to appease the Germans was not answerable 
to the League itself, received no public monies, and was subsidized mostly by private 
funds. 
The High Commissioner for the refugees from Germany worked hard to broker an in-
ternational agreement in 1936 that guaranteed the refugees from Germany some basic 
rights. The agreement was modelled on the Convention for the Russian refugees in 1933. 
It was, however, a watered-down version due to the intransigence of representatives of 
European states who wanted to yield the least possible national sovereignty while still 
insisting on having an international response to the refugee crisis. 
The international cooperation that the Arrangement of 1936 aimed at was based on the 
commitment of the first country of asylum to protect refugees. The international Agree-
ment fully preserved state sovereignty by a national determined, individual eligibility 
procedure for refugee status, rather than the clear-cut collective definition of a (Russian) 
refugee in 1933. The state’s right to expel refugees was preserved, but this was considered 
warranted only for reasons of national security or public order. The Agreement further 
stated that ‘refugees shall not be sent back across the frontier of the Reich unless they 
have been warned and have refused to make the necessary arrangements to proceed to 
another country or to take advantage of the arrangements made for them with that 
object’. This principle of non-refoulement as an incursion on the states’ right to deport 
refugees to the persecuting state was the crux of this international refuge regime. Sweden 
and Czechoslovakia, although their delegates were present at the conference, refused 
to adhere to this Arrangement. The decision makers in both countries considered it 
unacceptable that they were bound to a treaty that restricted their national sovereignty. 
In Czechoslovakia, which from 1936 onwards retreated from liberalism, the authorities 
insisted they did not want to be stuck down to a definition of refugee that would limit 
their possibilities to get rid of these aliens if they turned out to be troublesome.6  
Less than two years later, at an international refugee conference that took place in Ge-
neva from 7 to 10 February 1938, the agreement got more binding force in the juridi-
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non-refoulement but made the exception to this principle even more exceptional by only 
tolerating repatriation if the refugee had refused, without just cause, to make the neces-
sary arrangements to proceed to another country. By further qualifying when refoulement 
of refugees was possible, the Convention implicitly referred to the norm of appropriate 
state behaviour not to repatriate refugees. This declaration of intent restrained at least 
symbolically the sovereignty of the undersigning states, as states could only in excep-
tional cases have recourse to deportation of refugees. 
Also in contrast to the 1936 Arrangement, the Convention of 1938 included a chapter 
on labour conditions that had been copied from the 1933 convention concerning the 
Russian refugees. The restrictions for the protection of the labour market were not to be 
applied in all their severity on refugees from Germany and even waived after three years 
of stay in the country of asylum. This chapter had been crucial in the Convention of 
1933 for Russian refugees, as at that time states were constructing barriers that hindered 
the economic integration of foreigners within their population. The Convention of 1933 
had safeguarded the opportunities for Russian refugees to integrate economically in their 
country of asylum. In the Arrangement of 1936 that chapter was however left out as at 
that time national protectionism still held full sway and newcomers, including newly ar-
rived refugees from Nazi Germany were still to be excluded economically. The economic 
upswing since 1935 explains the change of course, together with a slowdown in the flight 
from Germany. The new state of affairs opened up the minds of policy makers for the 
stabilization of those who had fled Nazi Germany in 1933. Refugees who had not yet 
moved on could stay and they, similar to the Russian refugees, needed to be provided 
with economic opportunities to be able to integrate in the host country.   
That the international agreements for the refugees from Nazi Germany imposed weaker 
obligations on the states than the convention of 1933 for the Russian refugees was due to 
the very different challenge the new refugee flow posed. First the Soviets had denatural-
ized all refugees and repatriation was no longer a viable option. Secondly the USSR had 
closed its border and no new influx was to be feared. By 1933 the Soviet refugee crisis 
had long since ended and the international efforts were aimed at stabilizing this popula-
tion. The Convention of 1933 provided incentives to fully integrate Russian refugees 
who had long been present on the territory of the undersigning states. The situation of 
the refugees from Nazi Germany on the other hand was still very volatile. The states did 
not want to sign a blank cheque and therefor they limited their commitments to only 
those refugees from Germany who were already ‘lawfully residing’ in their country. The 
German refugee crisis was an ongoing crisis. The states made sure that they maintained 
a free hand in dealing with future refugee flows. Still, only seven states, mostly frontline 
states (Belgium, U.K., France, Denmark, Norway, Spain and the Netherlands) signed 
the agreement of 1936 and the convention of 1938. Switzerland adhered to the agree-
ment of 1936, but by 1938 Switzerland no longer wanted to be a first country of asylum. 
It saw itself only as a transit country within an international redistribution of refugees 
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and therefore refused to be a party in the international Convention of 1938.7 All coun-
tries that signed the Convention of 1938 expressed reservations about individual articles. 
The Netherlands even refused to sign the paragraph restricting the expulsion of refugees 
to Germany.8 
Both international agreements reaffirmed the view of the refugee from Germany as an 
immigrant who due to the involuntary nature of his/her immigration might deserve 
preferential treatment, but had no right to claim it. The contracting parties agreed to 
limit their administrative discretion in dealing with refugees for whom they were the first 
country of asylum. Susanne Heim assesses these agreements as “declarations of intent 
with no obligation. It could be used as a general guideline for dealing with the refu-
gees, but left sufficient scope of interpretation or even evasion.”9 Still these arrangements 
turned out to be adequate instruments to address the refugee problem as it posed itself 
that very year. This internationalization, rather Europeanization of refugee policy insured 
that a benevolent attitude towards refugees did not run the risk of acting as a magnet on 
refugees elsewhere, as all European states party to the international refugee regime were 
committed to stabilizing their refugee population. Although this arrangement had no 
teeth, its soft power expressed an international entente for closing off what later turned 
out to be the first wave of flight from Nazi Germany. The second wave of refugees, start-
ing in the spring of 1938, was even more a panic flight and would cause a radical change 
of heart among policymakers. Susanne Heim in her critical assessment refers to this later 
period when indeed evading the international refugee regime was the catch-word. The 
fortune of the convention of 1938 is telling: although it was signed by seven states, only 
Belgium and the U.K. actually ratified it before the outbreak of war in September 1939. 
The international refugee regime turned out to be too weak to function as a platform 
for international cooperation when in 1938 the refugee influx was suddenly perceived as 
threatening frontally national sovereignty. 
4. The implementation of the 1933 design of refugee policy, 1934–1937 
All liberal countries in Europe from 1933 onwards granted political activists a leave to 
remain, while Jewish refugees were temporarily protected pending their travel to a final 
country of abode overseas. These refugees had to be recommended by an aid organiza-
tion, which undertook to guarantee the maintenance of their refugees. After the mass 
arrival in 1933, the flight of political refugees was only a trickle of what it had been in 
1933. Jewish emigration, on the other hand continued in the following years, but also at 
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150,000 Jews had left and 350,000 Jews still remained in Germany. Most of these Jewish 
refugees in Western Europe had moved on overseas. The most common refuge was Pal-
estine. Argentina, Brazil, and Uruguay in South America also became important destina-
tions. The Latin American states assessed these applications on their economic potential. 
In Germany, many Jews had been successful entrepreneurs and traders, and therefore, 
particularly if they had been able to take some capital with them, they were considered 
interesting immigrants. It was of no relevance to the decisions of the Latin American 
states to welcome the German Jews who had been forced to leave Germany. 
In Europe the authorities remained the final arbiters of who was to be considered a 
refugee covered by the pledge of a refugee aid committee. However, in the day to day ad-
ministrative routine it was a system of effectively subcontracting the selection process to 
the private sector. As the authorities had no independent means to control the eligibility 
decisions, this implied that if a refugee for any reason was not recommended by a refugee 
aid organisation he or she had very little opportunity to qualify for protection. 
That state sovereignty was upheld was obvious in the treatment of communist refugees. 
Before 1935 communist refugees had been only a marginal issue in migration man-
agement. Most countries had denied asylum to refugees from Germany recommended 
by the communist aid organization, while those few countries (Switzerland, Denmark, 
France) who did offer communist refugees protection still expelled them when they re-
mained politically active. When German communists were denied asylum their aid or-
ganization denounced the hypocrisy of liberal democracies. However, for communists 
asylum was hinged to defeatism. The struggle for the communist victory in Germany 
was according to the communist movement very close. Therefore, asylum was only 
intended to offer a short pause to enable the German communist activists to recover 
strength and subsequently to resume the combat in Germany. For German communists 
for whom it was too dangerous to return to Germany –those who had been condemned 
to a prison sentence for more than half a year- the communist refugee aid organization 
recommended them to the authorities for protection. If protection was granted this was 
on the condition that they refrained from political activities. Foreigners supporting the 
communist cause were considered a threat to public order and to be expelled. However 
financial support by the communist aid committee was dependent on full time political 
work, these refugees were thus in a catch-22. The communist movement hardly contest-
ed the expulsion of communist refugees as these expellees were sent to the Saar, a region 
administrated by the French authorities under the control of the League of Nations. The 
concentration of hardened communist refugees in the Saar was part of the strategy of the 
German Communist Party to mobilize the local population against returning the Saar 
to German sovereignty during the plebiscite of January 13, 1935. Notwithstanding the 
communist mobilization, the Saar inhabitants decided nearly unanimously during the 
plebiscite in favor of a return to Germany. The several hundred hardened communists in 
the Saar had a hard time finding a new place of asylum. Asylum became a more impor-
tant objective of the communist struggle in Western European countries when in 1935 
the communist movement changed course with the Popular Front policy. The suicidal 
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strategy of the German Communist Party was aborted: the communists acknowledged 
that the Nazi regime was there to last. The relentless baffling of human rights by the Nazi 
regime meant that communists also needed asylum. The Popular Front policy meant 
that the liberal democracies had to be trusted. Merely denouncing these regimes was not 
enough; the communist parties had to find political allies so that communist refugees 
would be protected effectively. Communist parties unleashed a political struggle for asy-
lum for their comrades in danger. By bringing the issue in Parliament and on the streets 
the protection of German communists improved considerably. The issue lost some of 
its salience when the demand of liberal democracies for refugees to restrain politically 
was to a certain extent met by the communist movement. The decision to sacrifice the 
political activism of German communist refugees in Western Europe had its internal 
logic: German refugees should integrate (economically) in the countries of asylum which 
enabled the French and Danish communist movements to liberate funds allocated to 
the German refugees to subsidize their Popular Front initiatives in these countries. The 
Spanish civil war provide the communist movement the opportunity to kill two birds 
with one stone: cutting financial support for German refugees and providing soldiers for 
the International Brigades. When German communists wanted to fight Hitler they had 
to leave for Spain. In total about 3,000 Germans, mostly communists, enlisted to defend 
the Spanish republic.10
The only country that kept firm for long in denying communist refugees protection 
was the Netherlands. The Dutch ruling coalitions succeeded in keeping out the moder-
ate left from government until 1939, and all these years their alien policy was obsessed 
with keeping out the Reds. Even for the Dutch authorities, repatriating communists to 
Germany was a bridge too far; therefore, these subversive refugees were forced over the 
Belgian border. Shoving off refugees created diplomatic frictions. Under Belgian protests 
evoking the principle of first country of asylum, part of the international agreement of 
1936 the Dutch authorities agreed to protect those German communists for whom the 
Netherlands was the first country of asylum. In 1937 a bilateral agreement was conclud-
ed between the two countries which enabled Belgium to send back to the Netherlands all 
(communist) refugees for whom the Netherlands had been the first country of asylum. 
It turned out, however that for hardened communists at least the only Dutch place of 
asylum was the prison. 
This bilateral agreement was an example of the period of grace in the European man-
agement of refugees from Nazi Germany made possible by the international refugee 
regime. 
Authorities all over Europe were willing to adapt their immigration policy and thus yield 
some national sovereignty in order to integrate the remaining refugees from Nazi Ger-
many into the social fabric. The mass arrivals of 1933 was a one time eruption, and the 
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refugee policy developed in that year, heavily subsidized by the private sector had been 
an adequate response. By 1936 the consensus among the liberal states in Europe was 
formalized that each country had to stabilize the refugees, even communists and Jews for 
whom they were the first country of asylum. In particular, stateless Jewish refugees who 
had great difficulties in finding a final country of abode were singled out for a benevo-
lent policy. This decision highlights the pragmatic nature of police making in migration 
management. Herman Bekaert, the second in command of the Belgian alien police, 
explained to the civil servants in his administration the decision to grant stateless Jews 
the permission to stay with the following words: “It seems to be preferable to authorize 
their stay …rather than to “tire out” a foreigner by a procedure which is the playing field 
for the intervenants11 and which finally tires the alien police out”.12
Those refugees had also to be offered opportunities to start a new life. As mentioned be-
fore, the beneficiaries of the 1933 refugee policy were strictly prohibited from engaging 
in any economic activity, but by 1937, thanks to the economic revival, this economic 
exclusion was no longer strictly adhered to. Refugee relief organizations had been argu-
ing that they could not be permanently financially liable for their protégés. Refugees’ 
economic exclusion also entailed a loss of human capital. Even the institutions in charge 
of public order advocated opening up opportunities for the economic integration of 
(political) refugees as this would restrain their unwanted political activism. 
The arrangement of 1936 had important repercussions for those refugees already on the 
territory of those states party to this effort at international coordination, but it was not 
an open-ended commitment; future arrivals were not covered under this agreement. The 
arrangement only referred to persons ‘lawfully residing’ in the country of asylum, but in 
1936 several countries provided as a transitional measure an amnesty for refugees who 
were living illegally in the country. For France, this amnesty would entail by the summer 
of 1938 the legalization of the stay of 5,333 refugees and their families who had mostly 
emigrated, in an illegal manner to France in 1933 and 1934.13 By the end of 1937, most 
political and Jewish refugees who had arrived since 1933 in West-European countries 
and had not moved overseas were authorized to remain in the first country of asylum 
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5.  Radicalized Nazi anti-semitic policy prompts refugee policy  
to evaporate, 3-10.1938
In 1938 the number of refugees exploded as geopolitical changes brought more Jews 
under Nazi rule, and at the same time anti-semitic policies were radicalized. The first 
expansion of Hitler’s Germany was the incorporation of Austria into Germany in March 
1938, by which process the number of Jews under Nazi rule increased by 200,000. The 
incorporation of Sudetenland in October 1938 led to the flight of another 30,000 peo-
ple. Czechoslovakia became victim of Nazi aggression in March 1939 what created even 
more refugees.
The Nazi annexation of Austria had provoked a flight of political activists, but the vast 
majority of refugees from Austria were ‘Jews’ as the Anschluss prompted an almost im-
mediate and unprecedented wave of violence against the ‘Jews’. Terror, together with a 
high degree of administrative collusion to make Jews leave, caused nearly 50,000 ‘Jews’ 
to leave Austria by the fall of 1938.14 German police and border authorities even worked 
together to dump ‘Jews’ across the frontiers of neighboring countries. A brutal public 
brutality against the Jews in Germany proper started with the orgy of violence of Crystal 
Night (9–10 November 1938), followed by the incarceration of some 30,000 Jewish 
men in concentration camps. The plundering of refugees was part of this radicalization 
of Nazi policy. The Jewish inmates of the concentration camps were only liberated in 
order to leave the country stripped of their belongings. Similar to the flight of political 
opponents of the Nazi regime in 1933, the flight of Jews became an acute refugee move-
ment in response to a life threatening persecution.
The authorities of all European countries increased their border controls and imposed 
visa requirements as a way of stopping the intrusion of desperate Jewish refugees. In 
some countries, transport companies had, by the threat of sanctions to scrutinise their 
passengers’ passports and visas for their validity to enter the country.15 
The arrival of uninvited and destitute Jews in countries bordering Nazi Germany caused 
the authorities in these countries to question the (temporary) protection they had grant-
ed to Jewish newcomers from Germany since 1933. Every country was fending for itself. 
No international consultation took place. The authorities felt themselves being encircled 
by countries that had stepped up their border control much more effectively so that 
the refugee flow seemed to be directed only to their territory.16 The flight from Nazi 
Germany in 1933, although at a comparable scale, had had much less of an organized 
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policy placed great strains on a humanitarian policy. The authorities had the percep-
tion of being overwhelmed with destitute refugees, dumped in batches by the German 
authorities. Denying refugees protection was even couched in anti-Nazi rhetoric as not 
submitting to a German dictate.17 Burden sharing was not on the agenda; on the con-
trary, countries started pressuring neighboring countries to be stricter. Every country 
considered itself a victim of ‘lax’ neighbours whose borders were too porous. Some states 
were castigated because they let refugees enter who just passed through their territory en 
route elsewhere.18 The European states pressured each other to impose ever-tighter im-
migration restrictions-- a trend that built up a momentum of its own that went beyond 
domestic considerations. 
In the course of 1938, German Jews who had circumvented border control or overstayed 
their visa were increasingly treated as illegal immigrants, not refugees, by most “liberal” 
governments in Europe. They were, as any other undesirable alien, increasingly put in 
prison. In May 1938 in France an internal crackdown of unprecedented severity started 
and many refugees ended up in prisons. In other countries the Jewish refugees were even 
repatriated to Germany. The resolve to stop the dumping had become the trigger for a 
full-blown attack on the protection of ‘Jewish’ refugees. The Netherlands started hesi-
tantly in the spring of 1938, but Luxemburg, and Switzerland went radically for it in the 
late summer, and the Scandinavian countries and Belgium jumped on the bandwagon 
in the fall of 1938. 
This repressive policy was legitimized by a public discourse that presented Jewish refugees 
as troublemakers, undesirable competitors, and intruders. In May 1938 a Dutch circular 
letter stated explicitly that “refugees, foreigners who had to leave their country ‘under 
the pressure of circumstance’, were to be considered as unwanted guests.”19 The Jewish 
communities in these liberal countries bordering Nazi Germany, fully aware of the dan-
ger Jews were exposed to in Germany, were lobbying to uphold protection. Local Jewish 
communities, with the help of American Jewry, did their utmost to provide material as-
sistance to these refugees. However, the authorities lamented the loss of control over their 
borders and questioned the solvency of these committees overburdened with demands 
for assistance. The aid committees were in many countries sidelined in the decision mak-
ing process. The Jewish aid committees who remained solely responsible for assistance 
had no more say in who was protected by the state. They had to limit their assistance to 
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Policy makers countered domestic opposition to the deportation and imprisonment of 
Jewish refugees by underlining that refugees- but only genuine refugees- were still pro-
tected. Protection policy was largely limited to political refugees, whereas Jews fleeing 
Germany were considered another sort.21 Even the Netherlands granted communists 
asylum. That persecuted political activists were given a full entitlement to asylum was the 
counterweight to the attack on temporary protection for Jewish refugees. Notwithstand-
ing the fact that from 1938 onward the brutality of the persecution of Jews equaled that 
of political opponents, their persecution was minimalized. Even social-democratic circles 
took up the defense of their political refugees, at the detriment of the Jewish refugees.22 
The authorities even stated that they had caused the persecution upon themselves by 
among other  things, illegally smuggling currency. That they were persecuted was even 
denied altogether by pointing out that these ‘Jews’ left Germany with the agreement of 
the German authorities, while (political) refugees had to flee surreptitiously.23
6.  The first countries of asylum in disarray: hard line policy prevails, 
10.1938–9.1939
The majority of refugees fleeing Nazi Germany had to enter a neighboring country in 
an illegal manner. The border guards in countries such as Switzerland, the Netherlands, 
Denmark, and Sweden, which had a free travel regime with Germany, had great dif-
ficulty in distinguishing between bona fide German travelers and German Jews seeking 
entry with the intention to stay. The latter they had to exclude. The Swiss and Swed-
ish authorities insisted that the Nazi authorities provide them with a technical means 
to identify (and exclude) German Jews. Although the Nazis realized this would make 
getting rid of the Jews more difficult, they conceded, since it was the only way “Aryan” 
Germans would remain free from the requirement to obtain a visa to enter Sweden or 
Switzerland. In the fall of 1938, new passports for German Jews were introduced that 
included a red letter “J,” 3 cm high on the left-hand side of the first page, indicating their 
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kind of German passport shown at the border, the Swiss and Swedish authorities intro-
duced a clear-cut racial bias into their immigration policy. Domestic opposition to these 
arrangements was absent as this kind of control was largely invisible to the public and 
anyhow border and remote control were considered part of the privileges of the executive 
branch of government.24 
In spite of ever more restrictive border policies, refugees were still arriving in all frontline 
states. Borders remained permeable and people were still able to slip through. Refugees 
from Nazi Germany were highly motivated and ready to make almost any sacrifice in 
order to be safe. They were increasingly forced to rely on human smugglers in order to 
enter Germany’s neighboring countries. Human traffickers motivated by the high profits 
involved, were well informed and assisted the refugees effectively. 
Resettlement overseas became much more difficult. In July 1938, in the midst of the new 
refugee crisis, an international conference was convened in Evian, France by President 
Roosevelt to discuss solutions to this refugee crisis. This American initiative to interna-
tionalize the refugee issue could have stimulated the European countries to return to the 
liberal refugee policies of 1933, but the conference brought no solace to the refugees. 
The US was not willing to publicly state her willingness to resettle more refugees. Roo-
sevelt refrained from such a move as he did not want to alienate the electorate captured 
by nativist and anti-semitic sentiment.25 Brazil and San Domenico made token gestures 
in Evian, but only to please the US, and very few refugees were finally resettled in these 
countries.26 Overall in Latin America the authorities gave in to local protectionist and 
nationalistic forces, which were in particular opposed to the immigration of Jews and 
leftists. Mexico was the only country in Latin American to provide asylum to (political) 
refugees from Germany. Three thousand political refugees from Nazi Germany who had 
been engaged in defending the Spanish republic were resettled in Mexico. Notwithstand-
ing their tropical climate, poverty, and political instability countries such as Colombia, 
Ecuador, Bolivia, and Paraguay became countries of asylum. These states allowed refu-
gees to settle, not because they wanted to offer protection but because the authorities 
considered these immigrants useful, sometimes solely because of the bribes they gave 
immigration officials.27 Jews even went the whole way to China: The extraterritorial en-










 How the Refugees Crisis from Nazi Germany got (partly) solved through International Concertation | 55
to confront border guards and for that reason alone it attracted about 15,000 refugees 
from Germany.28 
Many more would have gone to Shanghai if they had had the means to pay for the pas-
sage. Those with less means tried to cross the green border by circumventing the border 
patrols of Germany’s neighboring countries. However, even if people smugglers helped 
them to enter the territory of a neighboring country, they still could be repatriated. The 
brutality of the persecution of Jews became obvious to all with the heavily publicized 
atrocities of Cristal Night. The Netherlands reinstated the protection for Jewish refugees 
immediately after November 10, 1938. 
When by the end of December 1938 the Dutch authorities had accepted 7,000 refugees, 
they considered that they reached the saturation point and decided to reintroduce the 
exclusionary policy for German Jews. The border became again a place of heartbreaking 
scenes. Even visa holders, single women and unaccompanied children were turned away. 
Refugees were shoved back and forth across the border. The Dutch rejoined again the 
hard line policy and expelled even those who had succeeded to enter its territory.
The hardline policy attacked the Jewish refugees head on. It was legitimized by a brutal 
anti-refugee rhetoric that was part of a larger xenophobic, if not anti-semitic discourse 
attacking immigration and diversity. The dangers of economic competition and the need 
to curtail unemployment, which had been central in bolstering a protectionist alien 
policy in the first half of the 1930s, remained part of this restrictionist discourse. By 
1938 the economy went into another downturn and political entrepreneurs singled out 
the newly arriving Jewish refugees as competitors for scarce resources. Criticism went 
beyond the material interests as there was also the oft-expressed fear that the inflow of 
Jewish refugees would create a ‘Jewish problem’ as these new arrivals aroused anti-semitic 
feeling among the population.29 
The only country bordering Nazi Germany where the political authorities returned to 
the policy adopted in 1933 was Belgium. At the border Belgian policy was as brutal as all 
other countries, but Belgium granted temporary protection to those Jewish refugees who 
had intruded on its territory. Jewish refugees knew that it was worth paying a smuggler 
to get them into Belgium. Once they had passed the Belgian-German border zone, they 
were safe. This turnaround was the result of an assertive humanitarian lobby, express-
ing itself most virulently at the moment of the Reichskristallnacht and galvanized by a 
Minister in charge of immigration policy who had provocatively defended his inhumane 
‘realpolitik’. This coincidence of factors meant that internal migration control moved 
out of the closed forums of Belgian policy making and into the public arena. The policy 
makers had to take a watchful public into account. 
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The Belgian policymakers, who had embarked on a policy of deporting Jewish refu-
gees had reluctantly restored the refugee policy of 1933. At the same time they intensi-
fied border control and even pressured the German authorities to keep their ‘Jewish’ 
persecutees ‘at home’. These diplomatic initiatives underline the Janus-faced attitude of 
the Belgian authorities towards those fleeing Nazi Germany. Publicly, all refugees who 
succeeded in entering Belgian territory were granted asylum, but at the same time the 
Belgian (but also (less surprisingly) the Swiss) authorities tried to convince the Germans 
to stop unauthorized immigration into their territory. From November 1938 onwards 
German border guards arrested Jews in the German border zone who did not have the 
required authorization to enter the countries at German’s western borders. From March 
1939 onwards even ‘Aryan’ Germans who were caught red handed assisting Jews crossing 
the West-German border were, upon implicit demand of the Belgian diplomatic repre-
sentatives, also incarcerated in concentration camps.30
The emigration over the western borders was slightly slowed down, while at the same 
time the Nazi’s strongly promoted the emigration of Jews to Eastern Europe and over-
seas. 31 Notwithstanding the German collaboration in preventing Jews from fleeing to 
Belgium, refugees knew that in order to be in safety they had to head to Belgium. While 
in 1939 very few Jewish refugees still fled to Luxemburg, Scandinavia, Switzerland or 
the Netherlands, Belgium took in nearly 20,000 refugees, a figure close to the French 
record. Both countries had difficulties to control their border with Germany, but more 
importantly they refrained from deporting refugees. France was less welcoming as the 
authorities still treated all those who illegally immigrated as illegal residents. The judges 
balked in particular at having to sentence refugees to long prison term, although they 
were much less threatening to public order than their habitual clientele. According to 
estimates from the Jewish refugee committee, about 9,000 refugees were sentenced to 
prison terms between May 1938 and July 1939.32 After serving their sentence the refu-
gees in France were not deported back home. This measure of deterrence was expensive 
and not very effective: for refugees even the French prisons were preferable to German 
concentration camps. The political costs could be high as the French authorities were 
perceived as having lost all control over their borders. Also in Belgium that was the case 
and law enforcement officials insisted strongly that Belgium had to withdraw from the 
Refugee Convention of 1938 in order to reaffirm control over its border. The head of 
the alien police Robert de Foy pointed out that Belgium was the only frontline state that 
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Robert de Foy exclaimed desperately “a nation which wants to live has to defend itself.”33 
However by then liberal elements who had supported the turnaround were at the helm 
of the state and the Minister of Justice retorted that the Refugee Convention of Geneva 
of 1938 did not restrain state sovereignty. For political and humanitarian reasons po-
litical and Jewish refugees who had succeeded to enter Belgian territory, even illegally 
were tolerated, but the authorities used the national discretion to determine individually 
eligibility for refugee status in the Refugee Convention of 1938 to deny Jewish refugees 
collective access to the official procedure for refugee status. In line with the policy design 
of 1933 these made Jewish refugees to be only in transit in Belgium and with no need 
for permanent Belgian protection as they were, in theory on their way overseas. While 
(political) refugees who were considered eligible for refugee status acquired some legal 
protection against administrative discretion, the Jewish refugees were refused this favor. 
When national interests would be at stake the Belgian authorities could always decide to 
deport these transit migrants as the executive authorities were not bound for those refu-
gees to international (and domestic) law.34 The Belgian executive authorities retained in 
this manner quasi full command over their immigration policy towards Jewish refugees. 
They had decided to respect the human rights of all those on its territory, notwithstand-
ing the very limited international support for doing so. However they were not willing 
to be bound to legal norms which could threaten their political survival. International 
instruments need international oversight to be effective. When World War II broke out 
in September 1939, 300,000 of the half million Jews in Germany in 1933 had left; of 
those who remained, half were above 50 years old. Soon the radicalization of the anti-
semitic policy would arrive at its final solution.
Conclusion
In this decade the sovereign right of the state to refuse an individual entry to its terri-
tory, even if he or she claimed to be a refugee, was not contested. Once refugees crossed 
the frontier they were no longer merely emigrants, but became asylum applicants to 
whom national norms could be applied. In 1933, the authorities baulked at expelling 
‘Jewish’ and political refugees who had entered the countries illegally or whose visas or 
residence permits had expired. For humanitarian reasons deporting them to Germany 
was considered unacceptable, while passing them on to other states created diplomatic 
problems. The very restrictive immigration policy of these years of economic crisis was 
amended. The policy of 1933 created the ‘refugee’ as an administrative category within 
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liberal European states agreed to a common norm of non-refoulement. The obstinate refusal 
of refugees to return “home” and their support by political allies in the country of asylum 
caused that these refugees could not be treated as any other unwanted immigrants. While 
the main gate remained closed, a side-door for refugees was opened. This side-door was 
relatively easy to open as private aid organizations agreed to subsidize the protection of 
these refugees. These agencies stepped in to assure that “their” refugees would not ag-
gravate the economic difficulties of the local population. Refugees were protected but 
still denied access to the country’s economy. The agreement of the authorities to protect 
refugees reflected not only the humanitarian concerns of the authorities, but also their 
desire to prevent refugees from endangering diplomatic relations or the domestic order. 
Refugee policy made the protectionist immigration policy more effective by making an 
exception to the most recalcitrant cases. It also legitimized a brutal exclusionary policy 
towards all other unwanted immigrants. 
The Arrangement of 1936 and the Convention of 1938 could be considered as the in-
ternational coordination of the refugee policy of 1933. It, however, went beyond mere 
coordination as it partly institutionalized and even liberalized refugee policy of the Eu-
ropean states that adhered to this international refugee regime. This international agree-
ment created common standards for handling asylum seekers. Bilateral pressure not to 
shove off refugees became much more effective as these international agreements showed 
a common willingness not to treat refugees as any immigrant. It enabled the states to 
put the irritation that these uninvited guests had caused behind and close off the refugee 
crisis that had erupted in 1933 in an efficient and humane manner. By 1937 the refugees 
who had fled Germany in the first years of Nazi rule could start rebuilding their lives in 
exile.
In 1938 all countries had to confront the reality of large numbers of destitute Jews ar-
riving at the border or inside the country, sometimes dumped in batches by the German 
authorities. Notwithstanding genuine evidence that their lives might be in danger if they 
returned to Germany, ‘Jewish’ refugees encountered outright hostility; from consular au-
thorities, at the border, even inside the countries of refuge themselves. That liberal states 
started to deport refugees from within the country was the most conspicuous departure 
from previous policies. That refugees who had succeeded in entering the territory of a 
liberal state and were recommended by the local refugee committee for protection were 
removed by force amounted to a challenge of the moral codes of behaviour of these 
states. The reasons for this rupture was that Jewish flight after the Anschluss was perceived 
as raging out of control. The arrival of ever more refugees, dumped and stripped of their 
possessions by the German authorities, convinced the authorities of the countries bor-
dering Germany that they should halt further Jewish immigration, notwithstanding the 
guarantee of the Jewish committees. The lack of positive action from the Evian Confer-
ence in the summer of 1938 demonstrated a complete lack of international political will 
in addressing the refugees’ plight. The frontline states felt they had to fend for themselves 
as the rest of the world was not willing to share the burden. 
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International coordination between 1936 and early 1938 had been the lever to finally 
put an end to the plight of the first wave of refugees, but by the summer of 1938 this 
was already a thing of the past. Each European government looked suspiciously to the 
other states, and each of them was afraid to become the magnet, implying that the policy of 
the most restrictive state set the tone. The fear of being out of step or too generous trig-
gered pre-emptive actions and produced an upward spiral of restriction. The just recently 
erected international edifice of refugee protection crumbled. In contrast to 1933, when 
a consensus had reigned that the first country of asylum was responsible, such argu-
ments did no longer cut ice. Refugee protection evaporated in a process of tightened 
immigration policy. Asylum turned out not to be dictated by the merit of the refugees’ 
claims, but determined by the terms established by the state. By 1938, the small group 
of political refugees, albeit by times very troublesome were proclaimed in all European 
countries as the only genuine refugees to be protected. The domestically decided solu-
tion to the plight of the Jewish refugees was an extremely brutal migration management. 
Even within the borders of most western European states the refugees were treated in an 
inhumane manner. Only Belgium and to a lesser extent also France retained protection 
for the Jewish refugees on their territory. The efficiency of their migration management 
was very weak, as their unique position made them into a magnet. However it was very 
effective as it assured minimum humanitarian standards in internal immigration policy 
and protected a considerable number of people until the war started. Efficiency could 
have been improved if these policy goals would have been internationally agreed upon. 
